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Abstract: Neutral money plays a central role in contemporary macroeconomic theory, and is 
a live issue in recent monetary policy discussions. We challenge the opinion that Hayek’s 
writings on neutral money have been influenced by, and are similar to, the work of Menger 
and Mises. We show, first, the significant alternative influence of Friedrich von Wieser on 
Hayek’s work on the subject. Second, we rehabilitate a neglected method of monetary 
theorizing specific to Menger and Mises that rejects money neutrality both as a tool for 
investigating monetary phenomena and as the standard by which monetary regimes, and the 
market economy itself, should be evaluated. Examining this chapter in the history of 
economic thought can aid in a deeper reconsideration of the doctrinal foundations of modern 
monetary theory and policy. 
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Over the last two centuries, economists have postulated the separation of the real and 
monetary aspects in economic analysis on the basis of one fundamental principle: the 
neutrality of money. Modern scholars acknowledge that Friedrich A. Hayek was the first 
economist to employ the term neutral money to clearly designate a state of affairs in which 
money does not exert an active influence on the determination of real variables. Hayek’s 
work in the early 1930s, notably Prices and Production (Hayek 1967 [1935]), gave the 
concept of neutral money currency among English-speaking economists (Lutz 1969).  
In at least two publications in the early 1930s, however, Hayek (1967 [1935]: 129, 
1984 [1933]: 160) also stated that both Carl Menger and Ludwig von Mises had discussed the 
problem of neutral money under the label of money’s “inner objective exchange value” 
(innere objektive Tauschwert), or the “inner value of money” (innere Geldwert) for short. 
Although Hayek never explicitly claimed that either man attributed analytical or normative 
significance to the concept, there subsequently arose a widespread tendency to ascribe a 
strong kinship between Mises and Hayek in the formulation of the neutral–money doctrine 
(Horwitz 2016: 62; 65).1 The Hayekian version of the neutral money concept was then 
described as the central concept of Austrian business cycle theory, originated by Menger, and 
developed by Mises and Hayek (Roll 1936: 458).  
This paper seeks to challenge this account of the development of the neutral money 
concept by analysing the differences between the views of the three authors—Menger, Mises, 
                                                 
1 For example, in his book on German Monetary Theory, Ellis (1934: 460) listed “Mises, 337-38,” under the 
“Neutral money” entry in the book’s subject index, despite the fact that neither the term nor the concept appears 
in the discussion of Mises’s business cycle theory on these pages. Ellis (1934: 335), however, did make the 
telling statement a few pages earlier, “For the full development of Mises’ theory it is necessary to study the 
work of Hayek.” Similarly, in his textbook, which was intended as a summary of “the present state of the debate 
in monetary theory” circa 1940, Georg Halm (1946, ix: 379) included Mises among “some theorists” whose 
analysis of the business cycle started from the proposition that cyclical fluctuations would not occur under “the 




and Hayek—on the issue. In doing this, we aim to rehabilitate a forgotten alternative way of 
monetary theorizing that was developed by Menger and Mises and rejects money neutrality 
both as a tool for investigating monetary phenomena and as the standard by which monetary 
regimes, and the market economy itself, should be evaluated. Furthermore, our investigation 
will also show that no accounts have fully explored the significant alternative influence of 
Friedrich von Wieser on Hayek’s work on the neutral money doctrine. As we shall see, 
Wieser—Hayek’s teacher at the University of Vienna and his formative influence in general 
economic theory2—had in fact originated the concept of neutral money that Hayek further 
explored in his own work. 
To this end, the paper is structured as follows: Friedrich von Wieser, as the originator 
of the neutral-money doctrine is treated first in section 3, and Friedrich A. Hayek, his student 
and two generations his junior, is examined next in order to highlight the essential identity of 
their views on neutral money. Ludwig von Mises, who was of the generation of Viennese 
economists between Wieser and Hayek, is dealt with in section 5 to clearly emphasize the 
contrasting attitudes toward the neutral-money concept and the distinct manner of theorizing 
between Hayek and Mises. Finally, Carl Menger is considered last in order to highlight the 
link between his and Mises’s views of the possibility and desirability of implementing a 
monetary policy in which money is rendered strictly neutral to the pricing process of a 
dynamic market economy.  
 In our view, this historical investigation is important at present for a proper 
understanding and continued reconsideration of neutral money. Before delving into the works 
of the four authors, let us first explain why tracing back the conceptual origins and 
development of the neutral money concept can help us achieve clarity on current doctrinal 
and policy matters.  
                                                 
2 On Wieser’s personal relationship with Hayek and his profound and persistent influence on Hayek’s thought, 




2. Why does neutral money matter? 
The analytical tool of neutral money came to play a central role in the development of 
modern macroeconomic theory (Klein 1947, Samuelson 1958). According to Patinkin and 
Steiger (1989: 137) the term itself, “neutral money”, often used interchangeably with the 
expression “veil of money”, “did not come into use until the interwar period, primarily as the 
result of the work of Hayek and Koopmans in the early 1930s.” Friedrich A. Hayek (1967 
[1935]: 129) himself gave credit primarily to Knut Wicksell for coining the term, to the 
German economist W. G. Behrens for first using it in a context similar to his own, and to the 
Dutch economist J. G. Koopmans (1933) for publishing the first comprehensive analysis of 
the concept. Laidler (1990) however, traced the term as far back as Wicksteed in 1910, who 
referred to the “covering cloak of monetary payments”;  Klausinger (1990) found it first in 
Schumpeter’s 1908 Habilitation thesis, while Boianovsky (1993) traced it further to Bohm-
Bawerk and Fisher. Schumpeter (1968: 264-5, 313-4, 561) in turn, considered neutral money 
(or the ‘money veil’) to be a customary expression and a defining feature of the orthodox 
economics which had been built on insights from David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill as an 
implication of the classical dichotomy between monetary or nominal values, and real values, 
or real riches, that putatively holds in the long run.3 
The construct of an imaginary barter economy was first used only in conducting a 
preliminary analysis of market-price determination before the emergence of money. 
However, the construct further evolved into a reference model for an actual monetary 
economy in which, although hypothetical, “a frictionless pure exchange economy without 
money” (Chaloupek 2010: 1) became normatively relevant as an efficiency standard. This 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Mankiw (2003: 107-8) and Abel and Bernanke (1992: 139). 
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was supported by the assumption that in a market monetary economy, “natural values” or 
“real prices” lie beneath money prices.  
The concept of the ‘monetary veil’ then allowed for changes in the value of money 
(e.g. as a result of a change in the money supply) to have no long-term effects on the 
distribution of resources and wealth, or on relative commodity prices, and thus for any 
potential short-term consequences to be dismissed as transitory. After the rational 
expectations revolution (Lucas 1975, Sargent and Wallace 1976), it became widely accepted 
that only real changes affect real decisions, and that variations in the purchasing power of 
money are neutralized if correctly anticipated (McCallum 1980)—not only in the long run, 
but in the medium and short run as well (Kaldor 1970, Lines and Westerhoff 2010).  
Notwithstanding this distinction4  in the use of the term “neutral money”, the 
assumption that changes in the quantity of money cause no change in the relative prices of 
goods is based on the same premise of the existence of natural values under the monetary 
veil. For all intents and purposes, the tension between the two conceptualisations is only 
superficial—or rather, a difference in emphasis, but not in kind. For Hayek, as we will see 
later on, the ideal monetary economy replicates the natural values of prices from the ideal 
barter equilibrium. For Patinkin (1965: 75) and Patinkin and Steiger (1989: 138), “in the 
absence of money illusion”—that is, in not employing a questionable comparison between a 
barter economy and a monetary economy, but in using barter only as a limiting position for a 
money economy—we can, however, 
“get as "close" as we want to a barter economy without affecting the 
equilibrium values of these variables and hence of real outputs. In this sense, 
these values in a money economy are the same as they would be in a barter 
economy. […][H]owever . . .  as the nominal quantity of money approaches 
zero, so does the price level - and at the same rate. Thus the limiting position 
that we have defined as a barter economy is one in which there exists the same 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to the anonymous referee who suggested clarifying this distinction.  
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real quantity of money as in a money economy! This drawback 
notwithstanding, there does not seem to be any other meaningful way of 
comparing the respective equilibrium positions of a money and a barter 
economy” (Patinkin and Steiger (1989: 138).  
As we shall see in the paper, Mises, influenced by Menger, rejected neutral money both as a 
theoretical tool and as the normative standard, because it refers, in both cases—albeit with a 
different emphasis—to an unrealizable barter economy. While the construct of an imaginary 
barter economy is valuable in conducting a very preliminary analysis of market-price 
determination, it is normatively irrelevant to the historical market economy, which “is real 
because it can calculate” (Mises 1966: 259)—and thus irrelevant to elucidating the workings 
of monetary policy. Once money, the tool of economic calculation, comes into existence it 
does so with a market of its own and therefore exerts a driving force or dynamic influence on 
all economic quantities. 
Neutral money is at present very much a live issue in monetary policy discussions 
around the level of the neutral interest rate5 and the goals of monetary policy. The political 
and academic consensus—of pursuing stabilization policies (of output or employment), as 
well as structural reforms of labour and capital markets, while anchoring the value of the 
monetary unit to a steady, fully anticipated rise in the price level—has its roots in the 
acceptance of the long-run neutrality of money. Any monetary policy that keeps prices rising 
constantly around announced levels is considered neutral to relative prices and real income 
levels, capturing otherwise idle market resources, such as unemployed labour.  
                                                 
5 The Wicksellian natural rate of interest is defined as the rate which “is neutral in respect to commodity prices, 
and tends neither to raise nor to lower them. This is necessarily the same as the rate of interest which would be 
determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money and all lending were effected in the form of 
real capital goods” (Wicksell 1962 [1936]: 102; emphasis added). In modern times, however, monetary policy 
makers use the rather opposite concept of the Keynesian neutral rate, in order to gauge “when the federal funds 
rate reaches a level consistent with full employment of labor and capital resources over the intermediate run” 




 Furthermore, what the neutral interest rate is (Williams 2003, Pescatori and Turunen 
2015), its time-varying characteristics (Öğünç and Batmaz 2011, Williams 2015) and how to 
measure it (Laubach and Williams 2015, Lubik and Matthes 2015), or how to fine tune a 
neutral monetary policy (Perrelli and Roache 2014) have also become intensely discussed 
topics, especially in the period after the 2008-2009 financial crisis (Chetwin and Wood 2013, 
Milhoj and Fischer 2015) and in relation to the monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
(Hamilton et al. 2015, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2016).  
In response to these developments, research into the non-neutrality of money has also 
reached a critical mass of works and theories, with scholars seeking to bridge the divide 
between real and monetary phenomena, and to apply these new insights to recent historical 
experience. According to various Post Keynesian and New Keynesian theories, money 
neutrality does not hold because there are macroeconomic inefficiencies in the real economy 
that hinder its adjustment to new nominal values following movements in the value of money 
(Meltzer 1988), even if the latter can be correctly anticipated. Scholars have further nuanced 
these discussions to include rigidities concerning transmission of information about 
purchasing power (Mankiw and Reis 2002) or “money stickiness”, i.e. a transitory nuisance 
of monetary injections reaching market participants gradually rather than simultaneously 
(Cheng and Angus 2012). However, the postulate of money neutrality is still included in the 
main assumption of these studies, i.e., that the real economy does not adjust—as it should—
to the nominal levels of variables. In this case, theoreticians postulate implicitly, if not 
explicitly, that it is still both theoretically and practically meaningful to distinguish between 
money prices and real relative prices. In other words, both modern supporters and opponents 
of the neutral money concept operate in fact within the same money neutrality paradigm, 
which seems to have swept the economics profession into a rare agreement.   
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In this context, retracing and clarifying doctrinal divergences between Mises and 
Hayek can help shed new and welcome light on current issues in monetary policy by 
strengthening and sharpening the debate surrounding neutral money and monetary policies 
that aim at making money neutral. As we shall see, the arguments put forth in the Mengerian 
and Misesian view not only challenge the neutral money concept, but do so from a radically 
different economic and monetary perspective than current critiques of the postulate, as both 
economists took an unfavourable view of the theoretical soundness and the practicability of 
the concept for monetary theory and policy. On the other hand, Hayek’s concept of neutral 
money—derived from the work of Wieser, and now widely accepted—invoked the 
desirability of a neutral monetary system. Even so, Wieser and Hayek both originally had 
reservations regarding the practical usefulness of such a system—another neglected point 
which can help nuance current discussions on the issue even further. 
 
3. Friedrich von Wieser  
The gist of the neutral-money concept first emerged from Wieser’s attempt to integrate 
money into his analysis of the “social” or market economy. The efficiency standard Wieser 
formulated to evaluate the performance of the social economy was based on his preliminary 
analysis of a centrally directed, moneyless economy that he called a “natural value” or 
“simple” economy whose endogenous variables were determined purely by real factors.6 
Although, his writings on monetary theory have been overshadowed by his 
contributions to value and distribution theory, Wieser was a monetary theorist of no mean 
ability or breadth of vision.7 Hayek (1992 [1926]: 122) himself characterized Wieser’s 
writings on money and credit “as nearly as suggestive for future research and equally full of 
                                                 
6 Wieser distinguishes between the “Theory of the Simple Economy” (a purely communistic economy) and the 
“Theory of the Social Economy” (the unhampered exchange economy). Cf. Wieser (1967 [1927], pp. 9-12).  
7 This paper only deals with one aspect of Wieser’s monetary thought. For surveys and critiques of Wieser’s 
overall monetary theory, see Anderson (1917: 74-9), Greidanus (1932:119-23), Ellis (1934: 81-7, 176-80), 
Dullart (1988) and Hülsmann (2007: 225-36). 
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new insights” as his price theory. His view was echoed by Schumpeter (1968: 1086, 1969: 
300) and Sennholz (1992: 5), while other doctrinal studies (Greidanus 1932: 119, Ellis 1934: 
176, Marget 1966, 1: 336-9) have identified Wieser as one of the originators of the income 
theory of money. 
In analysing and evaluating the performance of a money-exchange economy, Wieser 
(1971 [1893]: 37) originated the concept of natural value, which refers to an equilibrium 
structure of relative marginal utilities that would emerge in “a community at a high stage of 
development carrying on its economic life without price or exchange.” Wieser (1971 [1893]: 
62) also defined natural value as “the value which would be recognized by a completely 
rational and united commonwealth.” He then implicitly established such a static communist 
or “simple” economy as the criterion to be applied in appraising the efficiency of the market 
economy by seeking to “investigate closely to what extent the phenomena of exchange value 
are of natural origin.” Abstracting from the inequality of the distribution of “financial power” 
that inevitably attends the operation of the market economy, Wieser concluded that the 
introduction of exchange and, then, money into the analysis, in and of itself, does not yield a 
structure of money prices that are inconsistent with the underlying real equilibrium of natural 
values. As Wieser (1967 [1927]: 235-36) explained: 
The process of the formation of prices is much more diverse than that of the 
appraisal of values in the model simple economy, because of the introduction 
of many new factors. … But whatever new elements we have had to introduce 
into our investigation have not brought with them any new forces. Even the 
new element, money, is merely an instrument to effect exchange movements 
of natural values. 
 
However, according to Wieser, money departs from its purely intermediary and neutral role 
and exerts a driving force of its own—to use Mises’s term—whenever its value fluctuates. 
Thus, for instance, a fall in the value of money would involve a disturbance of the real or 
10 
 
natural economy by a one-sided supply of money, as Hayek referred to it, i.e., by a purchase 
of goods that has not been immediately preceded by a sale of goods. Moreover, the outcome 
of this initial disturbance, argued Wieser (1967 [1927]: 282), is not merely instability in the 
value of money but destabilization of the real economy itself: 
By the depreciation of money all prices are affected. The prices are 
permanently increased; the value of money is permanently changed. Because 
its value becomes permanently unstable, money functions with constant 
friction. The plan of all private and public economies is adjusted to the 
presupposition of the constancy of the value of money; money is given and 
received by those who assume that in the future it will have the same 
purchasing power as it has here and now. When this assumption proves 
incorrect many expectations remain unfulfilled, numerous economies are 
disorganized and more than one is ruined. 
Indeed, in his very last article on the theory of money, his “closing economic work”,8 that 
was published shortly after his death in the 4th edition of the famous Handwörterbuch der 
Staatswissenschaften, Wieser (1926: 705) made his position very clear by calling the people’s 
confidence in a constant value of money the “indispensable condition of the normal use of 
money” (die unerläßliche Voraussetzung des normalen Gelddienstes). These observations 
were made with the inflationary tendencies of the interwar period in mind. But inflation and 
the resultant depreciation of money were not the only possible problem for a monetary 
system. 
The effects of the appreciation of the monetary unit can be even more devastating in 
Wieser’s view. In fact, an increase in the cash-balance demand for money, ceteris paribus, 
can set in motion a universal business depression that would wreck the economy before the 
                                                 
8 The other editors of the Handwörterbuch (Wieser was actually one of them) state in a brief postface to the 
article that Wieser himself referred to it as his “ökonomische Schlußarbeit.” Hans Mayer had to do the final 
editorial work prior to publication. This encyclopedia entry is of great interest for our investigations, since Carl 
Menger was the author of the entry on money in the first three editions of the Handwörterbuch. Only after 
Menger’s death did Wieser assume the task. Their respective expositions allow for a direct and illuminating 
comparison, as we will see below. 
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requisite rise in the value of money could be completely consummated. According to Wieser 
(1967 [1927]: 285), “the appreciation of money would thwart the anticipations of every 
business man, would depress all sales prices and would decrease or wipe out all expected 
profits… it would become impossible to recover costs incurred and would bring in its train a 
universal crisis that would be more ruinous than any crisis engendered by overproduction in 
particular industries.” Such a crisis could not simply be caused by a general increase in the 
supply of goods or “general overproduction” as some proponents of the quantity theory 
argued and whose views Wieser decidedly rejected.9 Instead, it could be caused by a general 
increase in the demand for money. Only the latter would lead to a genuine appreciation of 
money and its potentially very harmful effects.  
While Wieser (1967 [1927]: 286) thus denied “the contention that increased 
commercial intercourse may lead to an appreciation in the value of money,” he affirmed that 
a fall (or rise) in the general price level reflecting an increase (or decrease) in the scarcity of 
goods due to changes in technology or capital and resource availabilities is possible and 
perfectly consistent with money’s function as an accurate and stable measure of price. The 
lower prices should then “properly be interpreted as an expression of the decreased value of 
goods” (Wieser 1967 [1927]: 286) due to the law of marginal utility. In the Handwörterbuch, 
he explicitly states that, even under the most rational monetary system, one could not prevent 
all changes in the purchasing power of money that are “the result of an intensification of 
economic processes” (die Folge der Intensivierung des volkswirtschaftlichen Prozesses) 
(Wieser 1926: 717). 
Wieser argued, however, that while an expansion in metallic or paper fiat currency 
may—viz., in the absence of an equivalent increase in the demand for money—precipitate a 
                                                 
9 For a critical discussion of the quantity theory, see also Wieser (1929 [1909a]: pp. 212ff.). In this essay as well 
as the associated lecture delivered at the Vienna meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik the same year, Wieser 
1929 [1909b] emphasized the importance of carefully distinguishing between the different causes of changes in 
the exchange value of money: they can come from the goods side as well as the money side, and their 
implications are very different.  
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process of depreciation, monetary depreciation does not generally result from an increase in 
fiduciary media, i.e., bank notes and deposits unbacked by the money commodity. This is 
because an emission of fiduciary media by banks does not exercise the same alleged one-
sided influence on exchange as gold discoveries or fiat-money issues. Thus, bank credit 
expansion does not displace the market economy from its natural value equilibrium. 
According to Wieser (1967 [1927]: 280-1), “Credit media come and go with the movement of 
commodities in business; they sublimate the natural values and are their companion values in 
monetary form.” Put differently, credit media of exchange are backed by business activity 
(geschäftlich gedeckt, see Wieser (1926: 690)).10  
In enthusiastic recognition of the service they render in maintaining the neutrality of 
the monetary system with respect to the natural economy, Wieser (1967 [1927]: 281) offered 
a paean to privately issued fiduciary media, while anticipating, and perhaps inspiring, his 
student Hayek’s enthusiasm for spontaneous social institutions:  
…they afford one of those surprising examples of free, individualistic, yet 
social institutions which are more perfectly adjusted to the general interest 
than would be possible through the most thoroughly considered, purposeful 
contrivances of the state. The voluntary organization of credit has achieved 
what no regulation of state-contrived monetary systems has heretofore been 
able to attain: a standard which receives its quantitative norm from the service 
of money itself. 
In contrast to the production of gold, which proceeds under the spur of private entrepreneurial 
profit seeking, and may under certain conditions cause disequilibrating effects of the resulting 
monetary inflation, Wieser (1967 [1927]: 281) concluded, “credit-money fulfils the spirit of 
money as enlightened statesmanship would determine it.” Despite these considerations, 
however, Wieser (1967 [1927]: 281-2) admitted that, left to the private market, bank credit 
creation could be and had been abused, interfering with “the equation of demand and supply,” 
                                                 
10 This is reminiscent of the British Banking School’s “law of reflux”, which Wieser (1967 [1927]: 245, 247; 
Dullaart 1988: 125) fully accepted. See also Wieser (1926: 694).  
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provoking “overproduction” and culminating in “liquidation crises.” Other shortcomings of 
fiduciary media are that, first—at least at the time Wieser was writing—their circulation does 
not penetrate to all income classes and economic regions (e.g., wage-earners and rural areas) 
and, second, their increase presupposes additional reserves of “ready money” (in current 
terminology, base money). These circumstances imply that, even assuming the benign 
responsiveness of fiduciary media, for an increase in the demand for money to be fully 
neutralized, “increased amounts of ready money are necessary” (Wieser 1967 [1927]: 286).  
For Wieser (1967 [1927]: 276-7), consequently, the ideal system for ensuring 
monetary neutrality would be a State-issued fiat currency: 
 “If once the state would issue it, no longer in its own immediate and selfish 
interest, but solely in order to substitute a well regulated monetary symbol for 
the costly, inconvenient hard money, which depends so much on the results of 
the production of the precious metals... The notes would take over the 
exchange value of the coin in the place of which they would appear. They 
would retain this value without being exposed to the disturbances which... 
have their origin in the production of the precious metals.”11  
                                                 
11 Elsewhere, in the German original, Wieser (1926: 716) describes his ideal monetary system in the isolated 
economy in the following way:  
 
Es kann kein Zweifel darüber bestehen, daß überall dort, wo man im Verkehre bereits an 
Noten gewöhnt ist – und wo wäre man das nicht! – das Papiergeld auf dem Markte den 
überlieferten Tauschwert des alten Geldes in geschichtlicher Kontinuität fortsetzen wird. Das 
neue Papiergeld wird nicht nur alle bestehenden Metallgeldschulden bezahlen, sondern auch 
auf dem Markte so viel kaufen wie das alte Metallgeld. Die Vorteile einer solchen 
Geldordnung sind einleuchtend. Die Masse des vorhandenen Währungsmetalls wird zu 
anderer Verwendung frei, man erspart die fortlaufenden Kosten seiner Erneuerung, das neue 
Geld ist der Gefahr der Depreziation entzogen, die von der reicheren Ergiebigkeit der 
Geldproduktion droht, und ebenso ist das Geldwesen von den Beengungen frei, die von der 
Erschöpfung der Goldproduktion zu befürchten wären; denn der Staat kann dem steigenden 
Geldbedarfe eines steigenden Verkehres mitentsprechender Erhöhung seiner Notenausgabe 
entgegenkommen. 
 
In our own translation, it reads:  
 
There can be no doubt that wherever you are already used to notes in circulation - and where 
wouldn't you be! - the paper money on the market will continue to be exchanged at the value 
of the old money in historical continuity. The new paper money will not only pay all existing 
metal money debts, but will also buy as much on the market as the old metal money. The 
advantages of such a money order are obvious. The mass of the existing money metal 
becomes free for other purposes, one saves the ongoing costs of its renewal, the new money is 
14 
 
Unfortunately, in the case of paper money, “the mass habit of acceptance” which is 
necessary to initiate and maintain a currency in circulation cannot extend beyond the 
domestic economy of the issuing nation-state. As a result, a strictly national fiat money will 
always be subject to fluctuating exchange rates, which would disturb the natural value of real 
goods and services in international trade. Gold, from this point of view, is “the less 
objectionable evil because it best secures an international constancy of values; it is thus 
preferable to the best regulated paper-money confined to a single state” (Wieser 1967 [1927]: 
277). 
To sum up, the neutral-money doctrine—in its embryonic Wieserian formulation—
argues that the standard of efficiency to be applied in evaluating the performance of the 
historical money-exchange or market economy is the pattern of relative values and resource 
allocations that would emerge in the exchange-less, centrally controlled simple economy with 
an identical constellation of real economic data. In Wieser’s view, given that entrepreneurs 
are looking back in time, and their automatic production decisions are governed by past 
prices, a change in the supply of or demand for money that is unmatched by a change in the 
overall supply of goods and services promotes a destabilization of the real (natural) economy.  
Additionally, he believed a one-sided decrease of the money-spending stream (as 
Hayek referred to the issue), in particular, will initiate an adjustment process that will 
culminate in a devastating depression and contraction of real economic activity rather than in 
a smooth transition to a higher value of money. While privately-issued fiduciary media can 
be an important means for spontaneously moderating deflationary adjustment processes, their 
imprudent and ill-timed issue is likely to continually recur, displacing relative prices from 
their equilibrium natural values and precipitating a boom-bust cycle of overproduction and 
                                                                                                                                                        
freed from the danger of depreciation, which emanates from higher yields of money 
production, and likewise the monetary system is free from the restrictions, which would have 
to be feared from the exhaustion of gold production; because the state can meet the increasing 
need for money due to increasing circulation with corresponding increases of its note issue. 
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business liquidation. Finally, the real-world monetary regime that would, in principle, come 
closest to embodying the features of Wieser’s ideal money is a paper fiat money issued by a 
supranational central bank. However, in a world of sovereign nation-states, the gold standard 
with its feature of fixed exchange rates will yield a price system that more closely 
approximates the system of natural values than a regime of freely fluctuating national fiat 
currencies.12 In fact, the stabilization of exchange rates was of very high importance to 
Wieser (1926: 714ff.).13 
 
4. Friedrich A. Hayek 
Hayek’s formulation of the neutral money concept was inspired—perhaps unconsciously, as 
he himself tells us—by his teacher Wieser (Hayek 1984 [1933]: 160). For Hayek’s neutral-
money doctrine is, in its essentials, nothing more than an attempt to elaborate the precise 
conditions under which Wieser’s one-sided influence of money would never emerge to drive 
relative prices away from their general-equilibrium configuration.  
Hayek (1992 [1926]: 116-7) thus accepted in his earlier writings the static (shadow) 
price system implicit in Wieser’s simple or centrally directed economy as the starting point 
for his own analysis. According to Hayek (1984 [1933]: 159), in developing the concept of 
neutral money, he sought to “isolate the influences which money actively exerts upon the 
economic process, and to establish the conditions under which [this process and] relative 
prices are not influenced by any but ‘real’ determinants—where ‘real’ relates to the 
equilibrium theory developed under the assumptions of barter.” As we have shown above, the 
pure exchange efficiency standards and the assumption that changes in the quantity of money 
                                                 
12 Wieser (1926: 717) writes: “Ein Weltpapiergeld ist heute eine Utopie. Unter den geschichtlich gegebenen 
Umständen muß das Weltgeld auf der Goldbasis verbleiben.“ [own translation: A world paper money today is a 
utopian idea. Under the historically given circumstances, world money must remain on the gold base.] 
13 The importance of a money with internationally stable exchange value has also been pointed out in Wieser’s 
(1929 [1904]: 167) inaugural lecture at the University of Vienna. 
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cause no change in the real, relative prices of goods are based on the same premise of the 
existence of natural values under the ‘monetary veil’. 
Having accepted the Wieserian standard for an efficiently operating monetary 
economy, Hayek deduced that any change in the volume of money—by which he meant “the 
volume of the money stream” or “quantity times the velocity of circulation” (Hayek 1966 
[1933]: 92 fn.)—disrupts the equilibrium of the real economy. Hayek (1966 [1933]: 108, 
emphasis added) expressed the point in clearly Wieserian terms:14  
changes in the volume of money have… a one-sided influence which elicits no 
reciprocal adjustment in the economic activity of different individuals. By 
deflecting a single factor, without simultaneously eliciting corresponding 
changes in other parts of the system, it dissolves its ‘closedness,’ makes a 
breach in the rigid reaction mechanism of the system (which rests on the 
ultimate identity of demand and supply) and opens a way for tendencies 
leading away from the equilibrium position. 
Although there is some ambiguity on this point, it appears in his earlier writings (roughly 
prior to 1931), Hayek upheld constancy of the money stock as the ideal policy norm, 
willingly accepting the implication that overall prices should fall in the face not only of an 
increase in real output that resulted from an enhancement of technology or factor supplies, 
but also as a consequence of an increase in the demand for cash balances (White 1993: 14-
16). Indeed, Hayek (1978: 84) confessed in his later years, that “at one stage” he believed that 
an increase in the demand for liquidity on the part of the community at large would “justify, 
                                                 
14 With his notion of the “one-sided influence”, Hayek in a sense generalizes the Wieserian term “einseitiges 
Geldangebot [one-sided supply of money]” (Wieser 1929: 178). In his Social Economics, Wieser clearly lays 
out the meaning of the one-sided supply of money as follows: 
   
“The equation of supply and demand is disturbed by the increase in the quantity of money.  
The demand, which originates from the money form, increases, but the supply of natural 
values [goods] remains the same.  Neither the gold miner who has struck an exceedingly rich 
deposit or the state which issues paper money in huge quantities are under any compulsion to 
introduce beforehand into the economic organism natural values in equal amounts which 
would prepare the ground for their demand.  They appear as purchases [sic, purchasers] in a 
market which they have never entered as sellers. Therefore they do not meet ready sellers 
without disturbing the market” [Wieser 1967 [1927]: 280; emphasis added).   
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and even require, that the value... of money should rise compared with that of 
commodities.”15 In terms of the equation of exchange, Hayek thus had at first maintained that 
a practical approximation to neutral money required that M remained constant, while P fell in 
response to a fall in V as well as to a rise in Y.  
However, in a footnote to Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, Hayek (1966 
[1933]: 92 fn.) redefined the “volume of money” so that it no longer referred to a stock, “the 
quantity of money in circulation,” but rather denoted a flow, “the volume of the money 
stream.” He refers to the first edition of Prices and Production published in 1931, where this 
flow definition was in fact already adopted.16 Thus constancy of the stream of money 
payments now became for Hayek, as it had been for Wieser, the hallmark of neutral money. 
This point was reiterated in the Preface to the second edition of Prices and Production 
(published in 1935), and again in the text, where Hayek (1967 [1935]: xii-xiii, 124) 
concluded that “any change in the velocity of circulation would have to be compensated by a 
reciprocal change in the amount of money in circulation if money is to remain neutral 
towards prices.”  
Wieser had maintained that the historical value of money rigidly conditioned 
entrepreneurial expectations of its future value. Hayek similarly argued that entrepreneurs 
myopically formulate their expectations and production plans on the basis of current prices, 
and therefore past configurations of relative prices. Therefore, should a pattern of prices 
develop that reflects the transient influence of a one-sided change in the volume of money, 
the effect will be an almost automatic misallocation of resources. This was especially the 
implication in his later writings—despite his efforts to “dynamize” the Wieserian concept of 
                                                 
15 See for example his early article on The Paradox of Saving, first published in German in 1929 and later 
translated and published in Economica in 1931, where Hayek (1969: 262) emphasized that “every increase in the 
volume of money” results in a disarrangement of the productive apparatus. 
16 Even though the German edition of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle was initially published in 1929, the 
footnote in question was one of “the numerous minor alterations and additions” Hayek (1966 [1933]: 15) said he 
made to the English edition because the footnote refers to Prices and Production published in 1931.  For 
confirmation of this, see Hayek (2012, p. 98 fn. 49). 
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general equilibrium—where Hayek sought to portray the price system as a means for 
disseminating dispersed knowledge to decentralized producers. According to Hayek (1978: 
82):  
successful economic action... depends largely on the approximately correct 
prediction of future prices... based on current prices and the estimation of their 
trend, but [which are]... to some degree uncertain because the circumstances 
which determine them will be unknown to most individuals. [Prices 
communicate] signals of changes of which the individual cannot know but to 
which his plans must be adjusted. This system works because on the whole 
current prices are fairly reliable indications of what future prices will probably 
be. 
It is important to recognize that Hayek’s depiction of the price system as a vehicle for 
disseminating knowledge depends crucially on his Wieser-inspired vision of the market 
economy as really operating in close proximity to the state of long-run equilibrium. Hayek 
(1952 [1941]: 27-8) explicitly states that “observation” reveals that “real conditions,” to some 
extent, “approximate towards a state of equilibrium… and that the functioning of the existing 
economic system will depend on the degree to which it approaches such a condition.” 
Neutralizing the one-sided influences of money was for Hayek (1978: 82), then, absolutely 
necessary for maintaining the integrity of the system of relative price signals and thus 
avoiding the systematic and, ultimately, unsustainable diversion of the pattern of resource 
employment from its equilibrium configuration:  
current prices of particular commodities… can be positively misleading if they 
are caused by non-recurring events, such as temporary inflows or outflows of 
money to the system. For such apparent changes in demand… systematically 
channel productive efforts into directions where they cannot be maintained. 
Early in his career, it is true, Hayek was almost exclusively concerned with explicating the 
non-neutral effects of an increase in the volume of money, in the form of the boom-bust 
cycle. Indeed, he came to be seen in the early 1930s as a “deflationist” or “liquidationist” 
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because he opposed any attempt to combat the depression by renewed credit expansion 
(Hayek 1966 [1933]: 19-22).  In 1932, he had argued against Keynes that inflationary policies 
were not advisable to counterbalance secondary deflation if its underlying cause is a previous 
maladjustment of the structure of production (Hayek 1995 [1932]: 194)17. But even during 
this period Hayek (1966 [1933]: 19) expressed no doubt that “an indefinite continuation of 
[the present] deflation would do inestimable harm.” Hayek argued later that the only reason 
for which he had accepted deflation as a temporary measure was of a political nature, i.e., 
because he believed at the time that “a deflation might be necessary to break the developing 
downward rigidity of all particular wages which has of course become one of the main causes 
of inflation” (Hayek 1985: 210).  
As the depression wore on, Hayek focused his attention increasingly on the issue of 
deflation. In Monetary Nationalism and International Stability, published in 1937, he 
reckoned as one of the “well-known defects of gold” and “a problem of major importance” 
changes in the value of gold threatened by “violent changes in the conditions of its 
production or the appearance of a large new demand for it” (Hayek 1971 [1937]: 75-6). In 
1943, Hayek (1972 [1943]: 215) set forth a scheme for a commodity reserve currency, which 
would stabilize commodity prices and “would also go far to stabilize the demand for 
manufactures and to prevent the [incipient] depression from becoming serious.” By 1975, 
shortly after receiving the Nobel Memorial Prize for economics, Hayek had completely 
abandoned any deflationist position:  
I would no longer maintain, as I did in the early ’30s, that for this reason, and 
for this reason only [rigidity of wages], a short period of deflation might be 
desirable. Today I believe that deflation has no recognizable function 
                                                 
17 Selgin (1999) argues that Hayek’s view was a “productivity norm” type of anti-inflationism, different from 
the extreme deflationist view that was attributed to him by later commentators. Due to this, Selgin (1999: 719) 
claims that Keynes and Hayek were much more similar in their views: “Hayek came at last to accept a view of 
optimal price level behavior that was practically the same as the one he had found wanting in Keynes almost 
half a century before. And Keynes… acknowledged on more than one occasion the merits of a productivity 
norm, which Hayek had embraced in the early 1930s.”   
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whatever, and that there is no justification for supporting or permitting a 
process of deflation. […] The moment there is any sign that the total income 
stream may actually shrink, I should certainly not only try everything in my 
power to prevent it from dwindling, but I should announce beforehand that I 
would do so in the event the problem arose (Hayek 1975: 5; 12-3).18 
Regarding the optimal monetary system from the standpoint of its approximation to the 
theoretical ideal of monetary neutrality, Hayek initially followed Wieser’s rankings of the 
gold standard and various kinds of fiat-money regimes. Like Wieser, he accorded the highest 
rank to a fiat money operated under the circumstances of “a securely established world State 
with a government immune against the temptation of inflation” (Hayek 1971 [1937]: 74-5).  
However, without such a world state and given the non-neutral effects on relative 
prices, interest rates, and international capital flows caused by fluctuating exchange rates, 
Hayek (1971 [1937]: 75) argued that “while an international standard is desirable on purely 
economic grounds, the choice of gold with all its undeniable defects is made necessary 
entirely by political considerations.” Nevertheless, Hayek’s Wieserian aversion to the 
disturbing, one-sided effect of money on the equilibrium system of relative prices achieved 
by real forces continually inspired him to devise practical alternatives to the international 
gold standard. As we noted above, in 1943, he took up the cudgels in defence of a commodity 
reserve currency, which was designed to meet the “really serious objection against gold… the 
slowness with which its supply adjusts itself to genuine changes in demand” (Hayek 1972 
[1943]: 211). In the twilight of his career, Hayek (1978: 106) was touting the virtues of 
competing, stable-value fiat currencies issued by private firms, which “can do much better 
than gold ever made possible” and whose low cost and uncomplicated system of provision 
                                                 
18 By 1978, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (1985: 210-11; emphasis 
added), Hayek had made it clear again: “Though I am sometimes accused of having represented the deflationary 
cause of the business cycles as part of the curative process, I do not think that was ever what I argued.” 
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“made it appear as at least more practicable than… a commodity reserve standard.”19 Hayek’s 
most mature scheme of monetary reform thus featured “denationalized” and competitively-
issued fiat moneys (Hayek 1978: 84-5), and was partly designed to avoid the one-sided 
effects of deflation by responding to an increase in the demand for liquidity by increasing the 
stock of money.  
 
5. Ludwig von Mises 
 
By the late 1930s, the neutral-money doctrine had come to exercise a strong hold on the 
minds of prominent monetary economists and the educated public, a hold which has only 
grown since then. Although Mises’s work has been identified as the inspiration for or, at 
least, bearing a close kinship with the Hayekian formulation of the neutral money doctrine, 
Mises denied responsibility for originating the concept, and in fact challenged both its 
soundness and its usefulness in monetary theory or policy:  
I myself am not responsible for the term ‘neutral money’… coined by later 
authors... I must protest the belief that it has to be a goal of monetary policy to 
make money neutral and that it is the duty of the economists to determine a 
method of doing so. I wish to emphasize that in a living and changing world, 
in a world of action, there is no room left for a neutral money. Money is non-
neutral or it does not exist (1990 [1938]: 77). 
In the first edition of the Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel, originally published in 
1912, the second edition of which was somewhat misleadingly translated into English as The 
Theory of Money and Credit, Mises explains that  
                                                 
19 It should be noted that Hayek—unlike Mises, for example—considered the creation of fiduciary media as an 
endogenous and necessary outcome of the operation of socially-evolved monetary and financial institutions and 
practices, especially the issue of fiduciary media by fractional reserve banks. According to Hayek (1966 [1933]: 
141-2), “this elasticity in the volume of money is an immanent characteristic of our present money and credit 
system…, an inherent necessity of the existing money and credit system that its reaction to certain changes in 
data is different from what we should expect on the basis of economic equilibrium theory.” Hayek thus gave a 
Wieserian twist to business cycle theory, portraying cyclical phenomena as one of the various dislocations of the 
barter equilibrium equation of supply and demand brought about by the one-sided supply of money. 
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money that is inserted as an intermediary between the other exchangeable 
goods is not merely a neutral link in the chain of exchange acts leading from 
the producer to the consumer. It also changes the position of the parties on the 
market. The medium of exchange is an economic good like any other; as such 
it is subject to an independent movement of values, and to the extent that this 
has not been included in the calculation by the purchaser and the seller or is 
contrary to their expectations, the success they have sought will not be 
achieved in exchange. […] In the mechanism of the exchange organization 
operates a force that can, under certain circumstances, shift the relationship of 
the exchanging parties; here is a source from which arise losses for some and 
profits for others (Mises 1912: 469; own translation). 
From this, Mises draws an unambiguous conclusion:  
This error certainly weighs quite heavily and no conceivable organization of 
indirect exchange can avoid it. Since indirect barter is a necessary 
phenomenon in the exchange economy based on the division of labour, these 
shortcomings are inextricably linked to it. No reform has been able to 
eliminate them. The ideal of money of unchangeable internal objective 
exchange value is unattainable and will remain so forever (Mises 1912: 469-
70; own translation).20 
Mises’s views on these issues are also clearly shown in three essays following the first 
German edition of The Theory of Money and Credit, where Mises discussed in practical terms 
                                                 
20 In the German original we read: 
Das Geld, das sich als Tauschvermittler zwischen die anderen Verkehrsgüter einschiebt, ist 
nicht lediglich ein neutrales Zwischenglied in der Kette der Tauschakte, die vom Produzenten 
zum Konsumenten führt; es ändert nicht unwesentlich die Stellung der Parteien auf dem 
Markte. Das Tauschmittel ist ein wirtschaftliches Gut wie jedes andere; es ist als solches einer 
selbständigen Wertbewegung unterworfen, und soweit diese vom Erwerber und vom 
Veräußerer nicht in den Kalkül mit einbezogen wurde oder ihren Erwartungen entgegen 
verläuft, wird im Tausche nicht jener Erfolg erreicht werden, den sie angestrebt haben. […] 
Im Mechanismus der Austauschorganisation wirkt eine Kraft, die das Verhältnis der 
tauschenden Parteien unter Umständen zu verschieben vermag; hier ist eine Quelle, aus der 
für die einen Verluste, für die anderen Gewinne entstehen. […] 
 
Dieser Fehler wiegt gewiß recht schwer und keine denkbare Organisation des indirekten 
Tausches vermag ihn zu vermeiden. Da der indirekte Tausch eine notwendige Erscheinung in 
der arbeitsteilig produzierenden Verkehrswirtschaft ist, sind diese Mängel untrennbar mit ihr 
verknüpft. Keine Reform vermochte sie zu beseitigen. Das Ideal eines Geldes von 




the general rise in prices, monetary devaluation, and purchasing power policies of that time 
(Mises 2012 [1913a, 1913b; 1919]). Written before Hayek became a regular attendee in 
Mises’s privatseminar in Vienna21, Mises describes in these essays, in detail, the gradual and 
uneven effects of changes in the value of money on relative prices and the distribution of 
wealth (2012 [1913b]: 161-62)—a phenomenon later coined ‘Cantillon effects’. Although he 
did not use the term neutral money or Cantillon effects at the time, Mises employed the same 
analysis, almost word for word, as in his 1938 lecture titled “The Non-Neutrality of Money” 
(Mises 1990 [1938]: 80).  
For example, in 1913, Mises explained that monetary devaluation  
“…only appears gradually throughout the economy. The prices of various 
goods do not rise proportionally all at once. Inflation first appears in some 
particular part of the economy, affecting only some goods, and then gradually 
spreads out from there… This gradual progression of rising prices causes its 
associated effects. The particular social groups who first receive the new 
quantity of money benefit from the process, while those are harmed who 
receive the money only later in the process” (Mises 2012 [1913a]: 142-43)  
He made the same point six years later, in 1919: 
 “…changes in the purchasing power of a nation’s currency do not take place 
immediately and do not occur at the same time in regard to all goods… The 
additional quantity of money appears somewhere in the economy, and then 
spreads out gradually. At first, it flows only into certain businesses and certain 
branches of production, raising the demand for only certain goods and 
services, and not all of them; later, the prices for other goods and services also 
start to rise” (Mises 2012 [1919]: 236). 
These insights were then reiterated in subsequent writings, originally published in 1924 
(Mises 2002 [1924]) and 1931 (Mises 2002 [1931]), and two essays from 1944 (Mises 2000 
                                                 
21 Hayek joined the seminar in 1924, after reading Mises’s book, Socialism, first published in 1922. Ebeling 
(2014: 143) explains that the topics of money and prices were often discussed: “when Hayek was participating 
he delivered presentations on the theory of imputation, credit and banking policy, price level stabilization, and a 
variety of related subjects.” Hayek moved from Austria to the UK to teach at LSE in 1931.  
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[1944a] and 2000 [1944b]). Mises also discusses his views briefly in criticizing Fisher’s 
compensated dollar plan in Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy (2006 [1928]:85-88) 
before he fully explored it in Human Action (Mises 1966 [1949]). For instance, Mises 
emphasized that  
“If all commodity prices and wage rates were to rise at the same time and to 
the same extent, even violent changes in the purchasing power of the monetary 
unit would be economically neutral and would not affect the income and the 
wealth of the citizens. But this condition can never occur... Some classes of 
prices and wages rise more quickly and to a steeper level than others. This 
unevenness is the main source of the social consequences of inflation” (Mises 
2000 [1944a]: 75).  
This shows that Mises’s views on the social consequences of inflation not only 
remained consistent throughout his scholarly work, but that Hayek was exposed to these 
views as early as the 1920s. However, as we shall see more clearly in what follows, Mises’s 
monetary theory exerted only little influence on Hayek’s writings, which more closely 
followed Wieser’s views on these issues, as we described before.22 
The main reason for these differences between Mises on the one hand, and Wieser 
and Hayek on the other, is the fact that the analytical basis of Mises’s opposition to the 
neutral money framework was rooted in an alternative tradition of monetary theorizing that 
                                                 
22 Hayek used Cantillon effects in his analysis of the business cycle as a “leitmotiv” in his critique of alternative 
monetary theories (Hagemann and Trautwein 1998: 293). However, as Hagemann and Trautwein (1998) show, 
his adaptation of Cantillon is different from Mises‘s in two ways: first, Hayek’s primary focus on the structure 
of production and investments neglects the role of expenditures for consumption, making Cantillon effects in the 
Hayekian interpretation (i.e. forced savings) a special case of the more general distributional and allocative 
effects (Hagemann and Trautwein 1998: 303). For Mises, however, both consumption and investment are 
equally important transmission channels of inflation, and in both channels Cantillon effects show the gradual 
and uneven adjustment of prices following an increase in the money supply. This leads to the second difference 
between Mises and Hayek,: while for Hayek, the crisis—and thus  Cantillon effects during the boom—could be 
avoided via compensatory voluntary savings to finance investments ex-post (Hagemann & Trautwein 1998: 
304), for Mises the Cantillon effects in the upswing of a crisis can only be compounded by the Cantillon effects 
of a post-financing of malinvestments, but never compensated (Mises 1990 [1938]) . For Mises, therefore, the 
non-neutrality of money is taken into account in its full distributional and allocative effects, thus dispersed, 
gradual and uneven among individual cash balances that any attempts at smoothing out the effects of a credit 
expansion are doomed to fail. See also Salerno (2012) for a brief discussion of the difference in emphasis 
between Mises and Hayek on malinvestment and overconsumption during a business cycle—difference in 
emphasis which in our view is due to Hayek’s restricted application of Cantillon effects to investments.  
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may be called the monetary calculation tradition and that, as we shall see in the last section, 
was originated by Carl Menger. The arguments put forth in this view not only challenge the 
neutral money concept, but do so from a radically different economic and monetary 
perspective than current critiques of the postulate we discussed in the first part of this paper.  
Let us now detail and contrast this alternative view with that of Wieser and Hayek.  
The Misesian approach was based on the fundamental insight that “money prices are 
the only vehicle of economic calculation” (Mises 1966: 201). As Mises argued in the socialist 
calculation debate of the 1930s, without recourse to economic calculation using the cardinal 
numbers provided by actual money prices, there would be no possibility of rationally 
allocating or “economizing” scarce resources. But Mises’s argument also implied that the 
concept of a barter economy with developed capital markets and a temporally lengthy and 
technologically intricate structure of production is a “fiction”—an imaginary construct useful 
only for the elaboration of elementary price theory (Mises 1966: 201). Analysing the 
formation of prices employing the “barter fiction,” as Mises called it, is essential for 
highlighting the fact that all market phenomena are traceable back to individuals’ subjective 
rankings of utilities, “to the universal category of preferring a to b,” and that, therefore, “what 
is ultimately exchanged is always economic goods of the first order against other such goods” 
(Mises 1966: 201-2). In reality, however, a direct-exchange economy, lacking a common 
medium of exchange by definition, would not permit the emergence of a structure of 
homogeneous and commensurable economic quantities necessary for calculation of the 
relative scarcities and most valuable employments of the factors of production.  
In particular, Mises argued, the interest rate, while not fundamentally a monetary 
phenomenon, can only find expression in a monetary economy. In the absence of monetary 
exchange, there would exist no unitary market for savings, and, therefore, each good would 
have a unique “own rate” of interest, rendering the ascertainment of the pure rate of interest 
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or social rate of time preference impossible, and investment in the structure of production 
chaotic. Mises (1990 [1932]: 65) thus explained that “[i]n a barter economy, the phenomenon 
of interest could never be isolated from the evaluation of future price movements of 
individual goods. To assume the existence of a highly developed market system without the 
intermediation of a generally accepted means of exchange would be a scientific fiction.” 
 Moreover, according to Mises (1966: 210-1; 230; 260-2; 491; 514-5), money prices 
generated by the historical market process give meaning to the very concept of capital and the 
related concept of income. In a barter economy, just as in a socialist economy, actors would 
be unable to quantify their capital and income or even to conceive the distinction between 
them. That is, lacking a common unit for expressing the market value of goods, they would 
be unable to discern whether a plan of present consumption out of current output impaired 
their capacity to produce for future wants, left it unchanged, or enhanced it. For example, 
without the aid of monetary calculation as expressed in capital accounting, an entrepreneur 
would be at a loss in ascertaining what proportion of the gross receipts of his business he 
would be free to expend on his personal consumption without at the same time consuming his 
capital. 
 In sum, Mises rejected monetary neutrality. The concept of neutral money refers 
exclusively to an unrealizable barter economy. Consequently, it should neither guide 
monetary theory nor should it be held up as a normative standard for monetary policy. Barter 
offers no means for economic calculation of profit and loss, for the conceptual, let alone 
quantitative, grasp of capital and income, or for the unitary expression of the interest rate and 
of the quantity of saving. But once money comes into existence it does so with a market of its 
own and therefore exerts a driving force or dynamic influence on all economic quantities. 
Only money prices ever have a real, if momentary, existence in the historical market 
economy, and these prices necessarily reflect the ever-changing relation between the supply 
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of and demand for the money commodity. The reason is that this “money relation,” as Mises 
called it, is embodied in—and indeed actualizes—the interdependent system of supply-and-
demand relations in the individual markets for non-monetary commodities. 
It should be pointed out briefly before proceeding that Mises’s conception of the 
purchasing power of money generated by the historical market process, explained in the 
regression theorem, is fundamentally different from the Wieserian historical value of 
money.23 In the 1953 English language edition of the Theory of Money and Credit, Mises 
(2009 [1953]: 100) explains that the objective exchange-value “is the most important kind of 
value, because it governs the social and not merely the individual aspect of economic life.” 
However, Mises is quick to point out that this objective exchange value “is not a property of 
the goods themselves, bestowed on them by nature, for in the last resort it also is derived 
from the human process of valuing individual goods” (2009 [1953]: 100). 
Furthermore, in developing his regression theorem, Mises acknowledges that “a 
historically continuous component is contained in the objective exchange-value of money. 
The past value of money is taken over by the present and transformed by it; the present value 
of money passes on into the future and is transformed in its turn” (2009 [1953]: 111). 
However, Mises (2009 [1953]: 112, original emphasis) explains further that “any suggestion 
of a causal relationship between past and present prices must be decisively rejected”, not 
only for non-monetary goods, but also for money:  
“It is so far as the money prices of goods are determined by monetary factors, 
that a historically-continuous component is included in them without which 
their actual level could not be explained. This component, too, is derived from 
exchange-ratios which can be entirely explained by reference to the subjective 
valuations of the individuals taking part in the market, even though these 
valuations were not originally grounded upon the specifically monetary utility 
alone of these goods. […] The historically transmitted value is transformed by 
                                                 
23 We are grateful to the anonymous referee who suggested clarifying this distinction. 
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the market without regard to what has become its historical content” (Mises 
2009 [1953]: 114, original emphasis). 
Mises (2009 [1953]: 117) contended that Wieser put forth “a theory which attempts to 
explain variations in the objective exchange-value of money (objective innere Tauschwert 
des Geldes) by reference to the relationship that exists in an economic community between 
money income and real income.” Mises viewed this as an insufficient attempt at a “complete 
theory of money—which, admittedly, the factors of supply and demand being excluded from 
consideration, would be certain to fail” (Mises 2009 [1953]: 117, original emphasis).  
It is reasonable to argue then that the erroneous view that Wieser maintained, i.e. that 
the historical value of money rigidly conditions expectations of its future value, is part and 
parcel of this failed attempt, and may have further influenced Hayek in his view that 
entrepreneurs formulate production plans on the basis of recently past configurations of real 
prices. From this, Hayek argued, as we have seen before, that one-sided changes in the 
volume of money, albeit through their transient influence on prices, produce an almost 
automatic misallocation of resources.  
Mises’s account of the regression theorem and the ensuing theory of money he 
developed explicitly rejects the Wieser-Hayek view and explains that the structure of prices 
employed in economic calculation is constantly and inescapably subject to changes from the 
money-side of the economy that cannot be disentangled from the alterations occurring 
simultaneously on the real side. Neutral money theorists implicitly deny this point when they 
fall into the trap of identifying the unrealizable price structure of an imaginary barter 
economy, which is unsullied by the one-sided influences of money, as the norm for judging 
the performance of alternative monetary regimes. This led Mises (1966: 202) to characterize 
the assumption of neutral money as “a serious blunder that owes its origin and tenacity to a 
misinterpretation of this imaginary [barter] construction.” 
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 Having argued that monetary calculation is the criterion of meaningfulness, as well as 
efficiency, for judging alternative economic systems, Mises confronted the question of 
whether variations in the value of money distort economic calculation and undermine the 
allocative efficiency of the pricing process. Decisively rejecting the construct of neutral 
money, Mises argued that in the actual market economy alterations in the relation between 
the demand for and supply of money continually occur and inevitably precipitate sequential 
and time-consuming adjustment processes that impinge on the structure of relative prices and 
incomes. The result is what Mises called “cash-induced” profits and losses that are 
indistinguishable from those associated with changes in relative prices. Yet any effects that 
these have on resource allocation can be ignored from the efficiency standpoint, precisely 
because neutral money is a contradiction in terms and economic calculation is inevitably 
monetary calculation, which can only proceed on the basis of a real-world money subject to 
dynamic market forces. As Mises (1966: 424-5) wrote, “the aims of monetary calculation are 
such that they cannot be frustrated by the inaccuracies which stem from slow and 
comparatively slight movements in purchasing power.”  
In other words, as a category of acting in the market economy, economic calculation 
implies the changeability of the value of money; it is therefore incorrect to argue that a money 
of variable purchasing power generates social inefficiency in the allocation of resources. 
Moreover, as Mises (1966: 224), pointed out, “Precision is unattainable in economic 
calculation quite apart from the shortcomings emanating from not paying due consideration to 
monetary changes.” Specifically, the future prices and future costs of production which are the 
data of economic calculations are themselves uncertain, and even the outcome of past 
production decisions remains uncertain to the degree that capital accounting must rely on 
future-oriented appraisements of the prices of equipment and inventories. And yet, Mises 
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(1966: 224) concluded, “economic calculation can achieve its tasks, [because such 
uncertainties] are inherent in the essence of acting that always deals with the uncertain future.”  
For Mises the market process at any moment is an organic entwinement of 
innumerable and interdependent adjustment processes—both real and monetary—in various 
stages of completion, which, in the very next moment, will be buffeted and displaced from its 
present course by fresh changes in the exogenous data. This market process is ordered and 
driven through time by entrepreneurs’ monetary calculations oriented to market conditions as 
they will emerge at a future date in historical time. In other words, the fact that the non-
neutral influences of money are always embedded in the historical market process and leave 
their imprint on the relative-price structure is no argument against the efficiency of monetary 
calculation, but merely an implication of the truth that the barter exchange ratios of general 
equilibrium are irrelevant for efficient action, and the only vehicle for economic calculation 
are money prices.  
As a result, in this view, an ideal monetary system is not one that stabilizes the price 
level or neutralizes the influence of money on relative prices, since this is unattainable outside 
of the imaginary state of non-action or equilibrium—and thus irrelevant to the concerns of 
monetary calculation. This is in fact Mises’s practical rebuttal of money neutrality, both in its 
early Wieserian and Hayekian, and later Lucasian and Patinkian versions.   
Rather, a monetary system prescribed by this view is based on the norm of “sound 
money,” which affirms the perfect suitability of market-originated commodity money for the 
purposes of economic calculation and enjoins the government from monetary interventions 
whose effect is to falsify and distort economic calculation. Explained Mises (1966: 223-4):  
What economic calculation requires is a monetary system whose functioning 
is not sabotaged by government. The endeavours to expand the quantity of 
money in circulation either in order to increase the government’s capacity to 
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spend or in order to bring about a temporary lowering of the rate of interest 
disintegrate all currency matters and derange economic calculation. 
For Mises, therefore, governmental “sabotage” of money has a very specific meaning: namely, 
the effect of persistent monetary expansion in falsifying economic calculation. This can occur 
in two ways. First, the government or its central bank may expand the money supply in order 
to finance large and persistent budget deficits associated with increased spending on war or 
reparations payments as occurred in Germany during and after the First World War. Such 
monetary policy ignites a “cycle of inflationary expectations” that eventually causes a 
hyperinflationary collapse of the monetary system. During the course of this cycle, 
inflationary expectations progressively take hold throughout the economy and eventually 
become completely “unanchored” from the monetary fundamentals. This development distorts 
consumption/saving decisions and grossly falsifies economic calculation of anticipated profits 
and capital values, causing resource allocation to become chaotic and the capital structure to 
disintegrate (Mises 1966: 426-8, 2006 [1923]: 1-14, Salerno 2010).  
The second manner in which money is sabotaged, according to Mises, is when bank 
credit expansion drives the loan or money rate of interest rate below the rate consistent with 
voluntary consumption/saving or time preferences. This natural rate of interest is reflected in 
the equilibrium rate of return on capital investment. If the central bank orchestrates the 
expansion of bank credit and the suppression of the loan rate below the natural rate by 
continual creation of bank reserves, the falsification of monetary calculation is especially 
extended and severe, and entrepreneurs are encouraged to borrow the increased credit and 
make investments in lengthening the structure of production to a degree that is not sustainable 
by the available pool of voluntary savings. The sequence of effects that results from central 
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bank manipulation of the interest rate is described in the Austrian theory of the business cycle, 
which was originated by Mises (2009 [1953]: 367-412, 2006 [1928]: 97-153).24 
Mises (1966: 224) further maintained that the sound money norm denoted a fully 
attainable historical reality, i.e. the classical gold standard, which was “very different from the 
confused and self-contradictory program of stabilizing purchasing power. For the sake of 
economic calculation all that is needed is to avoid great and abrupt fluctuations in the supply 
of money. [Precious metals] served very well all the purposes of economic calculation.” 25 In 
this context, Mises (1966: 422) also argued that the concepts of inflation and deflation imply 
“the popular fallacy that there is such a thing as neutral money or money of stable purchasing 
power and that sound money should be neutral and stable in purchasing power.” Accordingly, 
in contrast to Wieser and to Hayek, Mises did not fear that the increases in the value of money 
due to increases in “liquidity preference,” which are bound to occur on occasion under the 
gold standard, would undermine the function of monetary calculation.  
Mises argued that even if a change in the supply of money occurred that roughly 
matched a concurrent or prior change in the demand for money in the same direction, 
although it may leave the overall scale of prices roughly unchanged, it would not succeed in 
neutralizing the effect of the latter on relative prices and the social distribution of wealth. In 
fact, because these respective changes initially impinged on the economic system at different 
points, they would precipitate separate adjustment processes, each of which would exert its 
own non-neutral influence on the price structure. Thus, a central bank’s attempt to head off 
                                                 
24 Hayek held at first a similar view to Mises on the possibility and likelihood of national governments 
sabotaging the operations of the monetary system (cf. Caton 2018). In Denationalisation of Money, Hayek still 
argued, specifically citing Mises, that “It was not ‘capitalism’ but government intervention which has been 
responsible for the recurrent crises of the past” (Hayek 1978: 100). Nevertheless, he also diverged significantly 
from Mises by this time, calling for an ideal “rationally regulated world monetary system” (Hayek 1971: 74) 
made of competitive fiat currencies managed by a world government immune to inflation. 
25 For Mises, “great and abrupt fluctuations” refer to changes in the money supply that initiate the cycle of 
inflationary expectations.  Also, unlike monetary injections directly into credit markets to reduce the loan rate of 
interest, the accretions of new money due to variations in the production of gold are not systematically 




deflation by responding to a fall in V with a proportional increase in M would not succeed in 
moving the economy closer to the neutral money ideal. According to Mises (2000 [1944b]: 
120), “monetary fluctuations are not neutral, even apart from their repercussions on all 
contracts stipulating some form of deferred payments. Monetary changes are a source of 
economic and social change”, which cannot be targeted or undone by monetary policies, but 
only compounded.  
This point was acknowledged by Hayek (1967 [1935]: 124), who did not, however, 
fully recognize that quantitatively adapting the supply of money brings about a new host of 
economic and social changes without ever neutralizing the initial effects of changes in the 
value of money:  
in order to eliminate all monetary influences on the formation of prices, and 
the structure of production, it would not be sufficient merely quantitatively to 
adapt the supply of money to these changes in demand, it would be necessary 
also to see that it came into the hands of those who actually require it, i.e., to 
that part of the system where that change in business organisation or the habits 
of payment had taken place. 
For this reason, in their practical recommendations, Hayek allowed for monetary 
authorities to intervene in cases of an acute crisis to compensate the effects of 
deflation (Hayek 1967 [1935]: 298)—a suggestion which Mises deemed not only 
practically impossible, but theoretically untenable as well.  
Let us now turn to an examination of Menger’s attitude toward the notion of a 
money that has no effect on the course of development of real variables.  
 
6. Carl Menger  
Like Mises, Menger was indirectly implicated by later writers as a forerunner of the neutral-
money tradition. We would argue that Menger had in fact originated the view that economic 
calculation and efficient resource allocation could only be predicated on money prices and that 
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the general pricing process itself was inevitably shaped by monetary forces. However, 
Menger’s theory of money was incomplete (Chaloupek 2003); as Sennholz (1992: 25) 
explained, Menger “did not have the opportunity or inclination to analyze the various 
determinants of the objective exchange value of money. He offered no explanation of the 
process of value determination at any given time and place. Menger left this task to Friedrich 
von Wieser and Ludwig von Mises.” 
 Whereas Mises was able to explain and clarify his own position on this matter, 
Menger’s views needed to be posthumously defended against misinterpretation by monetary 
theorist Arthur Marget. Marget (1966, 2: 66-9) explained: 
[Menger’s] discussion was such as to emphasize, rather than to minimize, the 
importance of money in the functioning of the economic process… He did not 
argue, either explicitly or by implication, that a satisfactory ‘general’ theory of 
pricing should or could be constructed upon the basis of barter assumptions… 
[Menger’s] own distinction [between internal and external value of money] 
was to emphasize the fact that both ‘monetary’ and ‘non-monetary’ factors are 
of such far-reaching importance for price formation that one must be 
continually on one’s guard against specious attempts to explain a given set of 
price movements in terms of either ‘monetary’ or ‘non-monetary’ factors 
alone. He argued, in short, that any attempt to explain the ‘movement of 
commodity prices’ requires at every step in the process, not only the weapon 
of monetary theory, in the narrower sense of the term, but also the whole of 
the apparatus of ‘general’ [money] pricing theory. 
With his analytical focus set on the real-world pricing process, Menger eschewed the notion of 
monetary neutrality as an efficiency standard and—instead of dwelling on the alleged 
efficiency properties of the price system of a barter economy—he elaborated the role of 
money prices as the indispensable tool of economic calculation and rational resource 
allocation in a dynamic world. Indeed, in Menger’s revised article on money for the third 
edition of the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, we find a long discussion of the 
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benefits of money prices for the evaluation of the means and results of economic activity.26 
This emphasis is completely absent in Wieser’s later article on money for the fourth edition of 
the Handwörterbuch (Wieser 1926).   
Menger (1970 [1909]: 65) characterized the money unit “as a measure not of the 
quantity of exchange value contained in goods but rather of money prices, in the very sense in 
which the money unit [...] is the measure of all other monetary quantities.” In other words, 
prices expressed in terms of the money unit “provide at least a valuable reference point for 
judging the actual exchange relations of market goods and their variations on the same market, 
and likewise for comparing the exchange relations of goods on different markets.” For this 
reason, it is only the dynamic, money-using, historical market economy and not the fictional 
barter economy that fulfils the calculational preconditions of rational or purposeful action 
under the division of labour. 
Moreover, Menger (1970 [1909]: 72) points out that the benefits of monetary 
calculation and the importance of money prices increase further, the more general the use of 
money in exchange (“je allgemeiner das Geld seine vermittelnde Funktion im Verkehre übt”), 
the higher the dependence of individuals and groups on the market due to an extension of the 
division of labour and the monetary economy (“je grösser mit der Entwicklung der 
Arbeitsteilung und der Geldwirtschaft die Abhängigkeit der einzelnen Wirtschaften vom 
Markte”) and finally the more stable and secure the monetary system of a country (“je grösser 
endlich die Sicherheit und die Stabilität des Geldwesens eines Landes sind”). 
Monetary calculation enables the confrontation of an action’s costs with its benefits 
and the ascertainment of the quantity of the means available to the agent for future action, i.e., 
                                                 
26 In his own words, money prices provide a “ungleich übersichtlicheres und genaueres Mass der Mittel und 
Erfolge der Wirtschaft [more clear-cut and exact measurement of inputs and results of economic activities]” 
(Menger 1970 [1909]: 71). For the whole discussion of the benefits of money prices, see Menger (1970 [1909]: 
66-73), in particular, subsection 3 entitled Die praktische Bedeutung der Bewertung der Güter in Geld (“The 
practical significance of the valuation of goods in money”). We use Leland B. Yeager with Monika Streissler’s 
translation of the text (Menger 2002 [1909]). 
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his wealth or capital. As Menger (1970 [1909]: 66) expressed it, “[e]stablishing a measure of 
the inputs and results of economic activities, one's own and those of persons with whom we 
are connected by business or have other social relations, is of the greatest practical importance 
in very many cases of private and public life [...]; indeed it is the foundation and prerequisite 
of purposive action.” In a barter economy, rational economic calculation and the measurement 
of wealth and income are wrought with many difficulties. 
Menger (quoted in Endres 1987: 304) hinted at the inextricable link between monetary 
calculation and capital by defining the latter as “the productive property, whatever technical 
nature it may have, so far as its money value is the subject of economic calculation, that is if it 
appears in our accounting as a productive sum of money.”27 And Menger (1977: 12) also 
implied that monetary calculation itself constitutes a realistic standard of economic efficiency, 
which “facilitates a clear and accurate measure of means and results of economic life and by 
far exceeds that of the barter process.”  
In this analysis of Menger’s we find the kernel of Mises’s monetary analysis which 
emphasizes the non-neutrality of money. For Menger, as for Mises later on, money prices exist 
in the market economy only after a general medium of exchange emerges and monetary 
exchanges take place. The price structure then reflects the relation between the supply of and 
demand for money in a way in which money-side changes are simultaneous and 
indistinguishable from real-side changes. There is no ‘shadow’, real, or natural barter price 
structure, unsullied by the one-sided influences, which lurks under the monetary price 
structure that can be used as a norm for judging the performance of alternative monetary 
regimes. Menger made this clear when he wrote that:  
                                                 
27 In the original, we read: “Der Realbegriff des Kapitals umfaßt das Vermögen der Erwerbswirtschaft, welcher 
technischen Natur dasselbe an sich auch sein mag, insofern sein Geldwert Gegenstand unseres ökonomischen 
Kalküls ist, d. i. wenn dasselbe sich uns rechnungsmäßig als eine werbende Geldsumme darstellt“ (Menger 
1935 [1888]: 174). 
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Wherever barter in the narrow sense of the term disappears, and only sums of 
money (for the most part) actually appear as prices of the various 
commodities, a reliable basis for valuation in any but monetary terms is 
lacking. The valuation of grain or wool, for example, is relatively simple in 
terms of money. But the valuation of wool in terms of grain, or of grain in 
terms of wool, involves greater difficulties, if for no other reason than because 
a direct exchange of these two goods never takes place… Valuation in terms 
of other commodities is a more complicated procedure that presupposes prior 
valuations in terms of money (Menger 2007 [1976]: 276; emphasis added).   
In fact, Menger introduced the distinction between “the external exchange value of money” 
and “the internal exchange value of money” in order to emphasize the inextricable link 
between money and the real sphere. For Menger (2002 [1909]: 64-65) the external exchange 
value of money refers to “the general purchasing power of money” or “the exchange value [of 
money] expressed in commodities.”  Money’s external value or purchasing power is thus 
embedded in the actual array of money prices emerging on the market at any moment and 
cannot be separated from it.  Menger (2002 [1909]: 67) explicitly recognized that all market 
prices are co-determined by factors in the real sphere and the money sphere: “The exchange 
ratios between goods traded and money are always the result of determining factors both on 
the side of goods and on the side of money.” In other words, changes in the “internal value of 
money,” which occur as a result of autonomous variations in the supply of or demand for 
money, influence market prices in the same way as changes that originate strictly in the 
markets for goods. 
Menger (2002 [1909]: 68-70) argued furthermore that it was almost inconceivable that 
the internal exchange value of money would always remain invariant and therefore neutral to 
the pricing process. This is especially true when money itself consists of a good produced on 
the market such as gold or silver: 
Any impartial analysis of market phenomena makes us recognize the far 
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-reaching influence exerted on the exchange ratio between money and the 
goods traded by the variations in the quantity of money in circulation, the 
variations in the economy’s demand for circulating media, the increasing or 
decreasing production costs of the money metals, the more or less increasing 
use of document money [Urkundengeld], and many other changes in the 
determining factors of price formation occurring only on the side of money...  
Ever since precious-metal money was also recognized as an object of trade 
influenced by the factors determining price formation, monetary theorists have 
been striving to discover some other market good whose exchange ratio 
against other goods is not influenced by determining factors on the side of this 
good... [T]hey are looking for a good of universal and invariable ‘inner 
exchange value’28... Yet it is likewise beyond all doubt that no object of trade 
is to be found on our markets whose exchange ratio against all other goods 
remains invariant over time, nor is there one for which the price-modifying 
influences operating on the other objects of trade do not assert themselves at 
all (thus, on our markets there is no object of trade whose ‘outer’ nor one 
whose ‘inner exchange value’ is the same everywhere and at all times). 
At this point there emerges a tension in Menger’s exposition that might be at the root of 
diverging interpretations of his writings. Menger (2002 [1909]: 63) makes it very clear that the 
quest for a universally stable external exchange value of money, across time and space, is 
illusory. He writes that the “search for a solution to [this] problem, which has often and indeed 
not without good reason been called the squaring of the circle in economics, turns out, 
however, to be hopeless.”29 On the other hand, he does not in principle reject the possibility of 
stabilizing the internal exchange value of money and he admits that the latter might have some 
benefits.30 He argues that the problem of a stable internal exchange value is “incomparably 
simpler” (Menger 2002 [1909]: 70) than the problem of a stable external exchange value. This 
                                                 
28 Note that in this quotation the translators have chosen to render Menger’s terms “innerer Tauschwert” and 
“äußerer Tauschwert” more literally as the “inner exchange value” and “outer exchange value,” respectively, 
while we use the terms “internal exchange value” and “external exchange value” in the text.   
29 In the original: “Die Untersuchung über das obige Problem, dem vielfach und, zwar nicht ohne guten Grund, 
die Bezeichnung der nationalökonomischen Quadratur des Zirkels zu teil geworden ist, erweist sich indes als 
aussichtslos” (Menger 1970 [1909]: 74).   
30 Menger (1970 [1909]: 85) writes that “die Möglichkeit eines Gutes von stabilem inneren Tauschwerte ist 
prinzipiell nicht schlechthin ausgeschlossen [a good of stable exchange value is not utterly unthinkable.].”  
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simpler problem needs to be solved, if it is to be solved at all, by government regulation, since 
there is no good with constant internal exchange value on the free market (Menger 2002 
[1909]: 70-71). 
Hence, despite the inextricable link between external and internal exchange value of 
money highlighted in another part of Menger’s exposition, he also suggests that it might, in 
principle, be possible to have a money with fluctuating external and stable internal exchange 
value. He was, however, given the state of scientific knowledge, very sceptical about the 
possibility, in practice, of reliably identifying and quantifying the changing causes on the 
money-side. This, however, would be necessary to implement the corresponding monetary 
policy to offset these changes without distorting the real-side. 
 Indeed, he calls the necessary assumptions that have to be made in order to be able to 
identify and quantify the changing causes on the money-side “so far-fetched”. They are “so 
hard to test that even the most sensible methods of applying this idea cannot lead to an entirely 
satisfactory result. All methods of identifying interlocal differences and the movement of the 
inner exchange value of money that are based on this presupposition are even basically 
arbitrary and unsupported.”31  
In consequence, Menger was a proponent of a gold standard for the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, because it represented a practical means for realizing the real efficiencies of monetary 
calculation. In contrast to Wieser (1926), he would not – not even as a hypothetical ideal – 
suggest a paper money standard. However, he would recognize certain benefits to fiduciary 
elements in the money supply that automatically, that is, without direct government 
interference, push money towards a more stable exchange value (Menger 2002 [1909]: 84-8). 
When given the choice between non-intervention into the monetary sphere and a money 
                                                 
31 In the original: “ […] so künstlich, auch so schwer zu kontrollieren, dass selbst die sinnreichsten Methoden 
der Durchführung dieses Gedankens zu keinem ganz befriedigenden Ergebnisse führen können. Alle auf der 
obigen Voraussetzung fussenden Methoden zur Bestimmung der örtlichen Verschiedenheit und der Bewegung 




imposed by government force, Menger would have opted for the former,32 although he thought 
that the ideal lies somewhere in between, that is, his ideal was a market-based money polished 
by government regulation.33    
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper disentangles the evolution of two views on the neutral money concept in 
neoclassical economics. We have shown that Mises’s and Menger’s views on money pose an 
antithetical view to the intellectual kinship between Hayek and Wieser on the imaginary 
construct of a money-using economy in which monetary factors have no influence in shaping 
real variables. The Mengerian and Misesian views provide a more fundamental critique of the 
concept which rests on understanding money’s integral role in the market’s pricing process 
and in entrepreneurs’ calculational procedures. This provides a stronger foundation for 
critiques of the neutral money doctrine than that of modern studies by offering an alternative 
way of monetary theorizing—one which integrates the analysis of direct and indirect 
exchange instead of accepting the shadow “real” or “natural” prices assumption. 
                                                 
32 Menger (1970 [1909]: 106) writes: 
 
Die prinzipielle Zurückweisung des Zwangskurses ist ebensowohl ein Irrtum wie die prinzipielle 
Forderung desselben. Indes scheint mir die erstere denn doch den geringeren Irrtum in sich zu 
schliessen. Kann nämlich den prinzipiellen Gegnern des Zwangskurses mit Recht entgegengehalten 
werden, dass sie das, was im grossen und ganzen eine (von berechtigten Ausnahmen durchbrochene) 
Regel praktischer Wirtschaftspolitik ist, zu einem ausnahmslosen Gesetze verallgemeinern: so den 
Verfechtern des prinzipiellen Zwangskurses, dass sie dasjenige, was nur für gewisse Ausnahmefälle 
sich als nützlich oder notwendig erweist, zur allgemeinen Regel [...] erheben. 
 
In Yeager and Streissler’s translation: 
 
To reject legal tender on principle is just as much an error as to demand it on principle. It seems to me, 
though, that the former involves the lesser error. For while it may rightly be held against those who 
oppose legal tender on principle that they generalize what is a rule (on the whole, with justified 
exceptions) of practical economic policy into a law without exception, it may be held against those who 
advocate legal tender on principle that they turn something that proves useful or necessary only in 
certain exceptional cases into a general rule – indeed, by including legal tender in the very concept of 
money, into a law without exception. (Menger 2002 [1909]: 83) 
 
33 That Menger assigned a stronger role to government in his 1909 encyclopedia entry than in his earlier 
writings was also highlighted by Ikeda (2008). A very firm position in favor of sound money and skepticism 
towards government intervention came through in Menger’s Lectures to Crown Prince Rudolph, delivered at a 
time when he was a relatively young professor at the University of Vienna (Menger 1994 [1876]). 
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Furthermore, we have also shown that although the Wieser-Hayek view of neutral money is 
widespread among modern monetary and macroeconomists, it is often adopted in a much less 
nuanced version than either of its originators intended—each of whom had significant doubts 
surrounding the practicability and feasibility of a monetary system with neutral money or 
neutral monetary policy.  
These two conclusions thus shape up to a fresh challenge to the current purpose and 
form of monetary policies around the world, whose aim is precisely to make money neutral. 
However, if this purpose is at best highly impracticable, and most likely unrealizable, then 
the credibility and chances of success of such policies become problematic. This underscores 
once more the importance of seriously reconsidering the doctrinal foundations of modern 
monetary theory not only to illuminate, but hopefully even to completely shift the focus of 
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